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Deliberation’s Demise: The Rise of
One-Party Rule in the Senate
Charles Tiefer* and Kathleen Clark**
ABSTRACT

Much of the recent legal scholarship on the Senate expresses
concern about gridlock, which was caused in part by the Senate’s
supermajority requirement to pass legislation and confirm
presidential nominees. This scholarship exalted the value of
procedural changes permitting the majority party to push through
legislation and confirmations, and failed to appreciate salutary
aspects of the supermajority requirement: that it provided a key
structural support for stability and balance in governance. The
Senate changed its rules in order to address the problem of
partisan gridlock, and now a party with a bare majority is able to
force through much of its agenda. As a result, the minority party
no longer plays its traditional and vital role in Senate deliberation.
These rules changes—along with increased party polarization—
have diminished the Senate’s traditional role as a centrist
institution, and the nation is suffering from its loss.
The Senate’s record in 2017 illustrates the danger of
transforming from a deliberative institution to one where a party
with a bare majority can force through contentious legislation on a
straight party-line vote. This recent record may foreshadow even
more extreme steps. This Article examines the “nuclear option,”
which was employed to ram through the confirmation of Neil
* General Counsel of the House of Representatives, 1994–95; Professor
of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., magna cum laude,
Harvard Law School, 1977; B.A., summa cum laude, Columbia College, 1974.
** Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis; Counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 1991–93.
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Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, and reconciliation, which was used
to steamroll substantive legislation on tax cuts (successfully) and
health care (almost). The Senate has lost its way as a deliberative
institution and has come to resemble the House of Representatives.
To regain its stature as a deliberative body, the Senate must
revitalize the role of the minority party and stabilize its procedure.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: FROM CONCERNS ABOUT GRIDLOCK TO ONE-PARTY
RULE

A. Current Senate Concerns
In 2017, the Senate voted on majority party proposals to
repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 A small group of senators
from a single party wrote the proposals behind closed doors and no
Senate committee conducted hearings. By using a procedure
known as “reconciliation,” the truly dreadful bill came within one
vote of passage. Even some majority senators who voted for the
bill declared that they did not want it to become law.2 The nearrepeal of the ACA is just one example of the risk created by recent
changes in the Senate rules: changes that reduce the power of the
minority party, undercut the deliberation that the Senate has
traditionally provided, and diminish the Senate’s role as a critical
check in the legislative process.
For almost a century, the Senate imposed a supermajority
cloture requirement for the passage of most legislation and the
confirmation of presidential nominees.3 To pass significant
legislation, a party with a bare majority in the Senate had to
reach across the aisle for support from members of the minority
party in order to achieve supermajority support. By imposing a
supermajority requirement, the Senate handed power to members
of the minority party, who could extract legislative concessions
from the majority seeking supermajority support.4
This
procedural requirement fostered deliberation, with sponsors of
legislation looking for ways either to achieve affirmative
supermajority support for a bill or to persuade members of the
minority not to mount an objection. As a result of the Senate’s
supermajority cloture requirement, a sweeping legislative
program could pass the Senate only if one of two different
1. MJ Lee & Phil Mattingly, Health Care Debate: Senate Rejects Full
Obamacare Repeal Without Replacement, CNN (July 27, 2017, 2:44 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/politics/health-care-bill-wednesday/index.
html [https://perma.cc/WKX3-4P9L].
2. Id.
3. See Cloture Rule, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/Cloture_Rule.htm [https://perma.cc/59V3-WZKM] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018).
4. See id.
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conditions were met: either (1) the legislation was supported by a
majority party that had won a supermajority of Senate seats due
to an overwhelming electoral mandate, or (2) members from both
major political parties supported the legislation.5
The Senate has adopted several key procedural changes
reducing the scope of its supermajority requirement, with the
roots of this ongoing change visible as early as 2007, when the
Senate appeared to be on its way to becoming an institution of
one-party rule.6 In early 2017, a further sign of this change came
as the majority party forced through the confirmation of Supreme
Court Justice Neil Gorsuch.7 The Senate changed its rules to
deny the minority party a role in deliberation when the majority
party exercises the “nuclear option.”8 This virtually omnipotent
procedure could allow the majority party to change in its favor any
Senate procedure.
In 2017, the Senate also employed a second technique,
reconciliation, which enables the majority party to “fast track”
legislation by greatly reducing the role played by the minority
party. The majority party planned to push through parts of the
Trump Administration agenda while allowing only a limited role
for the minority party. Notably, the 52–48 Republican Senate set
out to use this technique (and avoid the sixty vote cloture
requirement) in order to repeal the ACA and enact large tax cuts
for the wealthy.9
5. See id.
6. Charles Tiefer, Congress’s Transformative “Republican Revolution” in
2001-2006 and the Future of One-Party Rule, 23 J. L. & POL. 233 (2007)
[hereinafter The Future of One-Party Rule].
7. Charles Tiefer, The Silencing of Elizabeth Warren, HARV. L. & POL’Y
Rev. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2017), http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/22/the-silencing-ofsenator-warren/ [https://perma.cc/2WBS-6264] (foreshadowing this trend);
Matt Flegenheimer, The Roots of the Battle over Neil Gorsuch: They Started
It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/
politics/supreme-court-neil-gorsuch-senate.html
[https://perma.cc/3B4XZB24].
8. Alexander Bolton, GOP Triggers ‘Nuclear Option,’ Gutting Filibuster
in Gorsuch Fight, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2017, 12:35 PM), http://thehill.com/
homenews/senate/327591-gop-triggers-nuclear-option-gutting-filibuster-ingorsuch-fight [https://perma.cc/6FPX-M2M2].
9. Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2121, 2125–36 (2013); Adam Cancryn et al., Senate GOP
Reveals Obamacare Repeal Bill but Still Lacks the Votes, POLITICO (June 22,
2017, 7:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/22/senate-obamacare-
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The majority’s “gamble on fast-track rules” to repeal the ACA
ultimately failed.10 Notwithstanding this particular failure, the
machinery of Washington governance has largely shifted. In the
past, the outcome of a bill in the Senate was determined by
centrists from both parties working together. In this new era, the
Senate Majority Leader’s goal was for a bill’s outcome to be
determined by the majority party acting by itself: one-party rule.11
Through one-party rule, the majority party was able to enact
an enormous tax cut, primarily benefiting corporations and the
top bracket. Only Republicans voted for it, and all Democrats
voted against it.12 That bill also repealed the individual mandate
in the ACA, which was expected to remove 13 million people from
health insurance coverage and increase health insurance costs for
the rest.13
As the Senate continues down the path of reducing the
minority party’s role, it comes to resemble the House. In the
House, the majority party (whether Republican or Democrat) has
for the last century occupied a dominant position, relegating the
minority party to a much diminished status.14 There are
advantages to having a Senate that is run differently than the
House: balance, consensus, centrism, and stability. Those
advantages are at risk as the Senate continues down the path
toward House-like one-party rule.
In addition, in 2017 the Senate used a third technique that
reduced the role of the minority party. The Congressional Review
Act permits a bare majority of the Senate (along with a majority of
repeal-republicans-secrets-239837 [https://perma.cc/6HNU-PC3X].
10. Robert Pear, Republican Gamble on Fast-Track Rules for Health Care
Hits Wall, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/26/us/politics/republican-fast-track-rules-obamacare-hits-wall.html
[https://perma.cc/H5H5-W9ZN].
11. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6.
12. Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/
us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection
%2Ftrump-tax-cut-plan&action=click&contentCollection=politics&region
=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=
collection [https://perma.cc/8UDY-GKMW].
13. Pear, supra note 10.
14. CHARLES TIEFER, THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, THE POST-TRADITIONAL
PROCEDURE OF ITS CURRENT STRUGGLES (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA, INC.
2016) [hereinafter THE POLARIZED CONGRESS].
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the House and the President’s signature) to eliminate by
“disapproval” recently promulgated regulations.15 This technique
does not require the sixty Senate votes for cloture, just a simple
majority.16 Republicans made extensive use of the Congressional
Review Act in 2017.17
B. Contrast to Fear of Gridlock
These developments demonstrate the need to reconsider the
direction of previous scholarship on the Senate. Much of the
recent scholarship about the Senate has focused on the condition
of gridlock and how the Senate needed to overcome it.18 Gridlock
has indeed characterized the Senate—and Congress as a whole—
from 2011 to 2016. Both gridlock and one-party rule result from
political parties’ unwillingness to work together toward
compromise. But observers who previously expressed concern
about gridlock should now recognize the troubling consequences
that have arisen from one-party rule in the Senate, including the
denial of any role for the minority party and the demise of
deliberation.
When a single party has a bare majority in the Senate, should
that party be able to push through its entire legislative agenda?
Or should the rules of the Senate require that a bare majority
compromise with the minority party?
This is not just an issue of the Trump era. This demise of
deliberation has developed over time as the Senate has made
changes to its rules, ratcheting down the power of the minority
party. One-party rule also stems from the increasing polarization
of the parties in general, and the Senate parties in particular, over
the past half-century. The Senate was previously dominated by
centrist institutional attitudes, including respect for bipartisan
15. 5 U.S.C.A. § 801 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-193).
16. Id.
17. Michael D. Shear, Trump Discards Obama Legacy, One Rule at a
Time, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/
politics/trump-overturning-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/SP3C-4YMM].
18. See Jason S. Oh, Commentary Diagnosing Gridlock, 67 TAX L. REV.
627, 627 (2014); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the
Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2217 (2013);
David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments
Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 53 (2006).
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committees, but is now dominated by majority party insistence on
achieving political goals with zero involvement from the
minority.19 Changes in the Senate’s internal rules reflect
increased party polarization. While Democrats are the ones
raising concerns about a diminished role for the minority party
right now, Republicans will have similar concerns when, as
eventually happens, they become the minority party.
This Article examines recent procedural changes in the
Senate that have empowered a bare majority to pass legislation
and confirm presidential nominees without regard for a minority
party’s concerns. Those who argued for these procedural changes
contended that they would solve the problem of gridlock. While
gridlock has been a problem, removing the supermajority
requirement also removes a key strength of the Senate. The
supermajority requirement gave the majority party an incentive to
work with members of the minority party, fostering cross-party
alliances among senators with divergent viewpoints who found
ways to work together toward legislative goals, creating a
legislative body that was not just representative, but also
deliberative. This Article proposes a framework that would
protect the deliberative function of the Senate. Rather than
wiping out the supermajority requirement entirely, these proposed
reforms would impose a supermajority requirement for
particularly sensitive legislative and confirmation battles.
The Senate has repeatedly made procedural changes that
ratchet down the power of the minority party and further
diminish deliberation. But it is not inevitable that the Senate will
continue down this path, to the demise of deliberation. There are
alternatives available to the Senate that would strengthen
deliberation, but these alternatives will be far from easy for the
Senate to achieve. They require a longer-term leadership
perspective, determined efforts at centrism among the senators,
pausing before taking radical steps, and tweaking the
supermajority requirement to strengthen the institution.
C. Overview
This Article builds on an earlier treatise and book on

19.

THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 4, 6–7.
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congressional procedure20 along with law review articles
examining particularly dramatic changes in congressional
procedure, going back to 2001 and continuing through the 2000s.21
These writings chronicled developments, such as the use of the
reconciliation process for passing legislation, which was not the
original purpose of that procedure. To address gridlock in the
Senate, these books and articles did not recommend radical
change (such as the blunt nuclear option), but instead proposed
limited moderate changes.22 This Article continues in that vein.
Part I of this Article outlines the ways in which the Senate
has denied the minority party its traditional role in deliberation
and the dangers that arise as a result. It describes procedural
changes that have ratcheted down the power of the minority party
and the slippery slope toward further changes that the Senate
appears to be on. Part II provides historical background on
Senate procedures. Some of the rules changes together with
increases in party polarization have made it harder for the Senate
to function as a centrist institution, and it has moved away from
balance and stability.23 Part III identifies options that would
strengthen deliberation in the Senate. Both parties need to
support procedural steps that will reinvigorate the center and
provide incentives for the majority party to cooperate with—
rather than subjugate—the minority party.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEAR-TERM DANGERS IN MINIMIZING
THE ROLE OF THE MINORITY PARTY

A. The “Nuclear Option”
Recent changes in Senate rules have severely cut back on the
role of the minority party. During the Obama Administration,
when the Democratic Party held a majority, it made two changes

20. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A
REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (Greenwood Press 1989)
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]; see, e.g., Jacobi &
VanDam, infra note 50; THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14.
21. E.g., Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About
Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 410 (2001) [hereinafter How to Steal
a Trillion].
22. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 171–81.
23. Id. at 84–106.
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to decrease the power of the Senate Republican minority.24
Most starkly, in November 2013, the Senate Democratic
majority took action to expedite the confirmation of most, but not
all, presidential nominees. Senate Republicans had slowed the
confirmation of President Obama’s judicial nominees to a crawl,
resulting in a large pool of judgeships left unfilled,25 and had done
the same to Obama’s nominees for executive posts. This was no
small thing. This exercise of minority party power was arguably
an abuse of power because the Senate minority used its power not
to pass judgment upon the credentials or fitness of individual
judicial nominees, but to prevent any confirmations for these posts
at all in order to create and to accumulate long-term vacancies.26
In the past, both parties had slowed the confirmation of the other
party’s nominees at the end of a President’s term, but had not
obstructed confirmations on such a scale.
In response to this wide-scale Republican obstruction,
Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid changed the cloture rule
for confirming almost all presidential nominees. Instead of
requiring a supermajority of sixty votes, confirmation would now
require only a bare-majority of fifty.27 Perhaps more significant
than the rule change itself was Reid’s method of making the
change. He used a procedure called the “nuclear option.”28
During consideration of a nominee, Reid raised a point of order
that a cloture vote “‘for all nominations other than for the
Supreme Court of the United States is by majority vote’” rather

24. The Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, also obtained a
compromise standing order as for when the filibuster might be eliminated on
a motion to proceed, but it did not matter much. John C. Roberts, Gridlock
and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2214 (2013).
25. William G. Dauster, The Senate in Transition or How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Nuclear Option, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
631, 642 (2016).
26. Id. at 641–45.
27. Id. at 648. Under Senate rules, the vice president has the power to
break a tie vote on the floor of the Senate, so a bare majority could consist of
fifty Democratic senators and the (tie-breaking) Democratic vice president.
See id.
28. Jim VandeHei & Charles Babington, From Senator’s 2003 Outburst,
GOP Hatched Nuclear Option, WASH. POST (May 19, 2005), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/18/AR2005051802144_pf.
html [https://perma.cc/RW9J-HW3E].
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than sixty votes.29 The President Pro Tempore properly ruled
that the point of order was not sustained. Then, the President Pro
Tempore put the question before the Senate, and the Senate voted
forty-eight in favor of the President Pro Tempore’s ruling and
fifty-two opposed, overruling the ruling. “The Senate had thus
changed Senate procedure for future nominations. The Reid
Precedent was set.”30 In plain English, a bare majority of the
Senate voted to decrease the cloture requirement for all executive
and almost all judicial nominations from sixty to fifty votes,
leaving the sixty-vote threshold only for Supreme Court
nominations.
The majority party had taken away a substantial minority
party right. It did not matter whether the minority party became
willing to act responsibly, to limit its stalling tactics to only
certain nominees, or even to pledge that it would yield after a few
days or after a few cloture votes. Rather, the minority party had
completely lost its right (except for Supreme Court nominations).
Resorting to the “nuclear option” reduced the unwritten taboo or
heavyweight reluctance in the Senate to invoke this procedure.31
But Majority Leader Reid walled off one type of decision as too
sensitive and significant for such diminished deliberation:
confirming nominees to the Supreme Court.
In 2015, Republicans became the majority party in the
Senate. The shoe was now on the other foot, setting the stage for
Senate action on Supreme Court nominees in 2016 and 2017.32 In
March of 2016, President Obama nominated Merrick Garland to
the Supreme Court. Senate Majority Leader McConnell and the
Republican Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee refused to
allow a committee hearing on or floor consideration of the
nominee.33 They did not contend that the President’s nominee
29. Dauster, supra note 25, at 648 (quoting Senator Reid).
30. Id.
31. Law & Solum, supra note 18, at 60–63.
32. Chris Cillizza et al., Why Republicans’ Senate Majority Could Be Very
Short-Lived, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/11/07/why-republicans-senate-majority-could-bevery-short-lived/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ef2d9ae1ba74
[https://perma.cc/LG3E-2BZ6].
33. David M. Herszenhorn, Mitch McConnell Tells Garland the Senate
Will Not Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016, 4:08 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
live/obama-supreme-court-nomination/mcconnell-tells-garland/
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was unqualified or unsuitable. This was about using their power
to obstruct President Obama and motivate members of their party
to elect a Republican President in November of that year.
When President Trump came to office and nominated his
Cabinet secretaries and other officials, the Senate (Democratic)
minority party had no ability to weigh those nominations, or
selectively deliberate over the most unacceptable nominations, or
even slow them down until the Senate had access to a complete
record. For example, the minority sought to delay a vote on Scott
Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency until after
the release of Pruitt’s emails that had been ordered by an
Oklahoma judge.34 The majority rejected this delay, and the
Senate confirmed Pruitt by a vote of 52–46.35 Days after Pruitt’s
confirmation, the emails were released, and they showed that
Pruitt had not told the truth about his email practices and
documented a cozy relationship between Pruitt and antienvironment lobbying groups.36
Betsy DeVos, the nominee for Education Secretary, lacked
relevant experience and was known as an opponent of public
schools in favor of charter schools. Her confirmation hearing went
forward even though information on her extensive finances and
conflicts of interest was not available.37 The Senate was 50–50
divided about confirming her, but the majority pushed her
confirmation through at breakneck speed without meaningful
time for deliberation.38
[https://perma.cc/9ZEJ-HKPW].
34. Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scottpruitt-environmental-protection-agency.html [https://perma.cc/LKQ3-5CBK].
35. Id.
36. Michael Biesecker & Sean Murphy, Records Show EPA’s Pruitt Used
Private Email, Despite Denial, NBC WASH. (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:52 PM),
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/politics/Records-Show-EPAs-PruittUsed-Private-Email-Despite-Denial-414907603.html [https://perma.cc/3N2N5UKW].
37. Dan Merica, Democrats Won’t Get a Second Hearing with Betsy
DeVos, Trump’s Education Pick, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 3:52 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/politics/betsy-devos-second-hearingdemocrats/index.html [https://perma.cc/WY53-TJC8].
38. Kaitlyn Burton, DeVos Confirmation: How Every Senator Voted on
Trump’s Education Secretary, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:32 PM), https://www.
politico.com/blogs/donald-trump-administration/2017/02/betsy-devosconfirmation-vote-count-234744 [https://perma.cc/AQ4M-6CC7].
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More significantly for Senate procedure, Majority Leader
McConnell’s refusal to confirm or even consider Judge Garland in
2016 preserved that Supreme Court vacancy in case a Republican
won the November 2016 election, as Trump did. Early in 2017,
President Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch, a nominee in the
Scalia tradition.39 At his Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
Gorsuch refused to disclose his views on virtually any legal
question, including whether he would vote to overrule Roe v.
Wade.40 In tone, he was polite and charming. In reality, he
treated the Senate as an institution unable to deliberate on his
(unstated) positions, with the nuclear option in his own back
pocket.
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer announced that
every single Democratic senator would stand together to filibuster
the Gorsuch nomination.41 The Democratic base was aroused by
President Trump’s election and in particular his nomination of
Gorsuch. Conversely, much of President Trump’s base looked at
this Supreme Court nomination as non-negotiable because it was
key to many conservative positions in general and overruling Roe
v. Wade in particular.42 Neither base left its Senate party able to
work out a compromise.
Such a compromise could have been possible; the minority
party could have let Gorsuch through in return for the majority
party’s promise not to use the nuclear option for “extraordinary”
future nominees.43 That would have tracked the compromise for
39. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/BA4N-T2KM].
40. Matt Flegenheimer et al., Gorsuch Completes His 20-Hour Test. So
How Did He Do?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/23/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-hearing.html
[https://perma.cc/5ADL-8M76].
41. Robert Barnes et al., Schumer: Democrats Will Filibuster Gorsuch
Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
powerpost/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-to-focus-today-on-testimony-fromfriends-foes/2017/03/23/14d21116-0fc7-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html?
utm_term=.d56572c6b47b [https://perma.cc/PFZ8-4A5T].
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Charles Tiefer, McConnell and Schumer Can Compromise to Avoid
the Nuclear Option on Gorsuch, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2017/04/04/mcconnell-and-schumer-can-
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lower court nominees that worked for the “Gang of 14” in the
2000s.44 In 2005, a bipartisan group of fourteen senators
negotiated a compromise to avoid the “nuclear option” by
promising a high level of minority deference to the majority
party’s confirmation efforts.45 Such a deal would have been
advantageous for both sides, though it would have disappointed
the extremes in each party. But in light of how strongly their
bases felt, neither party was inclined to compromise in 2017. The
Democratic minority did not have the will to relent on Gorsuch,
and the Republican majority did not have the will to prevent
confirmation of President Trump’s most extreme Supreme Court
nominees in the future.
So Majority Leader McConnell invoked the nuclear option for
Supreme Court confirmations.46 He obtained the Chair’s negative
ruling, appealed, and won the appeal for limiting debate on
Supreme Court judgeships. Gorsuch was confirmed to the
Supreme Court. In terms of Supreme Court action, the
confirmation of Neil Gorsuch certainly mattered on its own.
Gorsuch was a mere forty-nine years old and will likely be a part
of the Court’s right wing for decades.
But the way that Gorsuch was confirmed will also have
lasting significance,47 because the nuclear option will limit Senate
deliberation over future Supreme Court nominees.48 The prior
reluctance to use the nuclear option was not absolute, in that Reid
invoked it for lower court and executive nominees in 2013. The
Senate had used the same approach—overruling the Chair—in
previous decades to make a large number of changes to its

compromise-to-avoid-the-nuclear-option-on-gorsuch/#7e3c78cd3a8c
[https://perma.cc/3HV3-Q24W].
44. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster,
the Median Senator, and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT.
REV. 257, 258 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Seung Min Kim et al., Senate GOP Goes ‘Nuclear’ on Supreme Court
Filibuster, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2017/04/senate-neil-gorsuch-nuclear-option-236937
[https://perma.cc/9Q6PWZ6E].
47. Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to
Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the
Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 271 (2004).
48. Min Kim et al., supra note 46.
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procedure, albeit most of those changes were minor.49 There had
certainly been occasions when the Senate majority party changed
Senate procedures, including some when the minority party
protested.50 However, those minor adjustments in Senate
procedure pale in significance compared with the 2013 decision to
deny the minority party the power to resist executive and lower
court nominations—let alone the 2017 decision to crush any
minority party ability to resist Supreme Court nominations.
Moreover, this change means that when other Supreme Court
seats become vacant, if the Senate majority party is united, it can
again confirm nominees without the minority party having any
right to weigh or even significantly discuss.51 Forty-nine minority
senators will not have the right to raise an alarm about what will
happen to the Court. Single-party rule, rather than deliberation,
will drive Supreme Court nominees to confirmation.
Future nominees may have views even more extreme than
Gorsuch’s, with their confirmation shifting the balance of the
Court. For example, when Justice Kennedy, the median Justice,
retired and President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh, a
judge considerably to the right of Kennedy, the ideological balance
of the Court shifted, and the minority did not have the power to
weigh or delay that nomination.
B. Reconciliation for Trump Agenda
There is a significant danger that the Senate will attempt to
pass large portions of the Trump Administration’s substantive
agenda using the technique of reconciliation. The reconciliation
procedure has been used in deficit swelling tax cuts and in bills
dealing with health care, and may readily serve those ends
again.52 The Byrd Rule limits how far reconciliation bills can
stray into non-fiscal “extraneous” subjects.53 For example, the
49. Dauster, supra note 25, at 651–53.
50. Gold & Gupta, supra note 47.
51. See Michael J. Gerhardt & Richard W. Painter, Majority Rule and the
Future of Judicial Selection, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 263 (2017).
52. Looking back, “every reconciliation bill from 1980 through 1994
included health care provisions . . . .” Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The
Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the
U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 313 (2013).
53. Kysar, supra note 9, at 2131–32; THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra
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Byrd Rule would keep a provision attacking Planned Parenthood
out of a reconciliation bill addressing health care finances. On the
other hand, who knows whether the Senate majority party will
respect the limits drawn by the Byrd Rule when it is facing some
all-important moment in the future.54
More broadly, the recent use of the nuclear option (i.e.,
reducing the cloture requirement from sixty to fifty votes) for
nominations in 2013 and 2017 raises the possibility of using the
nuclear option for legislation as well. Majority party senators
expressed opposition to this in both 2013 and 2017. But
increasing polarization may dial up the pressure to avoid the
normal sixty-vote requirements for cloture on legislation.
For example, Congress must periodically pass legislation
increasing the debt limit to ensure that the government can pay
its obligations (such as interest on the debt and Social Security
benefits).55 Failure to increase the debt limit would cause the
nation to default; its exchanges of payments would seize up, and
the government would go into the fiscal equivalent of cardiac
arrest. The urgency of getting such a “must-pass” bill through the
Senate might lead to carving out an exception to the cloture
requirement. Perhaps the Senate majority party could not be
faulted for doing that, but the “nuclear option” is a slippery slope.
Using the nuclear option for any legislation at all would
undermine the deliberation that comes with a sixty-vote
supermajority cloture requirement.

note 14, at 140–42.
54. See Alexander Bolton & Niv Elis, Senate Ref Holds Power Over
Trump Agenda,
THE
HILL
(May
9,
2017,
6:00
AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/332465-senate-ref-holds-power-overtrump-agenda [https://perma.cc/6GXB-96XP]. See also Paige Winfield
Cunningham, Senate Staffer Speaks Softly but Carries Big Stick, WASH. POST
(May 30,2017),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/
20170530/281861528459715; Charles Tiefer, Senate Republicans May Go AllOut for Anti-Abortion Provisions in the Health Care Bill, FORBES (June 26,
2017, 9:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2017/06/26/senaterepublicans-may-go-all-out-for-anti-abortion-provisions-in-the-health-carebill/#33dca358367e [https://perma.cc/R2HZ-G883].
55. See Charles Tiefer, Confronting Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces
Federal Shutdowns and (Almost) Debt Defaults, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 511
(2014).
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C. Congressional Review Act
In 1996, Congress enacted the Congressional Review Act
(CRA) as part of Speaker Newt Gingrich’s ideological program.56
It allows a bare majority of the Senate (i.e., without sixty votes for
cloture), together with the House and the President, to disapprove
recently enacted agency regulations.57 Before 2017,58 it had been
successfully invoked to disapprove only one regulation.59 It comes
into play when regulations promulgated at the end of the term of a
President of one party are subject to disapproval for a few months
by a Congress and a successor President of the other party. Under
those circumstances, the Senate can move and pass the
disapproval action of the prior President’s regulations by a mere
fifty votes pursuant to the CRA rather than the usual
supermajority of sixty votes for cloture.
2017 proved an ideal period for the CRA. President Trump
longed to demonstrate muscle-flexing in his first hundred days,
but it would take some time before Congress or even his own
administrators could produce concrete law-changing action. So
Congress passed and President Trump signed into law fourteen
regulatory disapprovals pursuant to the CRA.60
Some of these regulatory disapprovals have considerable
significance. Congress used this technique to disapprove, and
thereby block, the “Stream Protection Rule,” which required coal
producers that engage in mountaintop removal to restore streams
once their mining is complete.61 The Interior Department had
56. See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency
Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96 (1997).
57. 5 U.S.C.A. § 801 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
58. See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 2162, 2162–63 (2009).
59. How to Steal a Trillion, supra note 21, at 471.
60. Tim Devaney, Here’s How Trump Is Using a Special Law to Do Away
with Obama Regulations, THE HILL (Mar. 26, 2017, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.
com/regulation/325737-heres-how-trump-is-using-a-special-law-to-do-awaywith-obama-regulations [https://perma.cc/QMQ6-3PW4]. The rules range
from another workplace ergonomics rule, to the taking of wildlife in Alaska,
to how to prepare land-use plans for public lands. A list is at https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Review_Act [https://perma.cc/DT6G-J3JP].
61. Ari Natter, Trump Signs Measure Blocking Obama-Era Rule to
Protest Streams, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/trump-signs-measure-blocking-
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spent seven years crafting the rule and estimated that it would
protect 6,000 miles of streams and 52,000 acres of forests.62
The symbolic significance of the fourteen rule disapprovals
was even greater than the practical significance. President
Trump wanted to create an image of activity, but was unable to
produce serious full-scale executive actions during his first six
months in office. Moving normal legislation through the 52–48
Senate (without the CRA’s built-in cloture) was not easy.
Moreover, his own bureaucracy was understaffed at the top levels,
and could not conduct the full notice-and-comment procedures,
including legally strong justifications, to rescind regulations.
Despite the Trump Administration’s inability to provide elaborate
administrative preparation and support, Congress’s extensive use
of CRA disapprovals helped create the impression that President
Trump was taking action. The CRA (and its failure to require a
supermajority vote in the Senate) made that possible, fourteen
times.
III. MINORITY PARTY STATUS: BENEFITS, BACKGROUND, AND
UNDERMINING FACTORS

A. History63
1.

1975

The Senate adopted a cloture rule in 1917, and it required
sixty-seven votes to force the end of a filibuster. During the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, white supremacist senators used the
filibuster extensively to block civil rights legislation. From 1949
to 1975, senators supporting civil rights legislation engaged in
“the Great Struggle,” fighting to curtail the civil rights filibuster
so that their bills could go through.64
In 1975, the Senate lowered the threshold for cloture from
obama-era-rule-to-protect-streams.
62. Id.
63. See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE:
FILIBUSTERS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (The Brookings Institute, 1997).
64. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 20, at 704. The
1949–50 Congress included a strong contingent of Northern Democrats
supporting civil rights who were elected along with President Truman in
1948. Eric Schickler et al., Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics
from 1933-1972, 72 J. POLS. 672, 674 (July 2010).
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two-thirds (sixty-seven votes) to three-fifths (sixty votes). This
change was the result of a reform effort that was bipartisan, with
Senate Democrats, strengthened by the 1974 post-Watergate
election, receiving a forceful and unprecedented ruling from the
Republican chair, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, who had a
career-long commitment to civil rights.65 Likely due to the
bipartisan process that created the 1975 change, it was perceived
as institutional reform rather than a partisan political power
grab. The 1975 change was seen as legitimate, and it resulted in
stability rather than triggering a cascade of further procedural
changes for partisan advantage.
Meanwhile, in a little-noticed step, the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 included a provision called “reconciliation.”66 This
technique required only a bare majority vote, not a supermajority
cloture vote, to bring swift action. Reconciliation seemed to apply
in a narrow set of circumstances: to annually enact deficitreducing provisions in an annual package of limited scope—just
spending cuts or tax hikes—to make that particular single year’s
budget stay on target.
2.

1981

President Reagan’s 1980 election brought a Senate
Republican majority, and seemed to constitute an electoral
mandate.67 The Republican Senate used the
reconciliation
process to pass an enormous purported cost-savings bill that was
intended to justify an even more enormous and very real taxcutting bill.68 The bill included several provisions that were
unrelated to the deficit reduction process. In response, Senator
65. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6, at 247 n.81.
66. For studies of reconciliation (and the PAYGO system), see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy of
the 1995-96 Budget Train Wreck, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589 (1998); see also
Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998); see also James A.
Miller & James D. Range, Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New
Politics of the Budget Process, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 4 (1983).
67. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 20, at 885.
68. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6, at 250. The purported
cost-savings bill including much that did not really deliver savings, such as
cuts in authorizations that were not actually going to produce cuts in
spending. Id.
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Robert Byrd convinced the Senate to adopt the “Byrd Rule,”
prohibiting the inclusion of “extraneous” provisions in a
reconciliation bill.69 As reconciliation has grown in importance, so
has the reconciliation-limiting Byrd Rule.
Meanwhile, the ideological divisions within Congress
gradually became congruent with party lines. Conservative
Southern Democrats, known as “boll weevils,” had served as a
centrist swing group, leading to centrist bills as they allied
alternatively with moderate Democrats to their left or moderate
Republicans to their right. Over time, conservative Southern
Democrats were replaced by Southern Republicans. Another
group smaller in number, liberal Northern Republicans known as
“gypsy moths,” was replaced by Northern Democrats.
The election of 1994 swept in the radical Gingrich Republican
House majority and a Republican Senate majority, further
polarizing Congress.70 Gingrich’s changes to House rules in 1995
reduced the role and independence of committees, which
previously facilitated the inclusion of centrist minority party
views through co-sponsorship of some bills and acceptance of some
amendments. Instead, one-party leadership backed by the
majority party caucus predominated in the House. In subsequent
years, as House members gradually won entry into the Senate,
they brought with them the polarized Gingrich model, inflaming
the partisan divide within the Senate.
3.

2001

In 2001, President George W. Bush won an electoral college
(but not popular vote) victory and Republicans won a 50–50
majority in the Senate.71 Even though this was not much of a
mandate, it started a six-year period of “Republican Revolution,”
foreshadowing something like “one-party rule.” The Republican
party held both chambers and the presidency, but it held the
Senate sometimes by only a very narrow margin. For the Senate
Republican party to accomplish its goals, they would have to
circumvent or overcome the extant parliamentary restraints

69. 2 U.S.C.A. § 644 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-193).
70. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6, at 240.
71. Id. at 252–53.
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requiring a supermajority.72 Their success in achieving those
goals was somewhat at odds with the “gridlock” thesis (i.e., that
Congress could no longer pass much legislation because of the
strong barriers to action, especially in the Senate).73
Despite having only a bare 50–50 Republican majority in the
Senate, Republicans were able to enact enormous tax cuts in 2001
thanks to extreme and outsized use of reconciliation.74 They used
reconciliation to do precisely the opposite of the deficit reduction
intended by the original Congressional Budget Act. They
accomplished this by using special new reconciliation techniques,
such as a “sunset”75 provision on enormous tax cuts that
nominally ended after nine years.76
Another 2001 event that was little noticed was the Senate
Majority Leader’s sacking of the Senate parliamentarian.77 The
parliamentarian has significant responsibility, including advising
the Senate chair on how to rule on whether a motion is in order
and whether a proposed provision is consistent with
reconciliation.78 The parliamentarian is expected to interpret and
apply Senate rules without fear or favor, and the parliamentarian
is not supposed to be threatened or fired for the inevitable rulings
that go against the majority. In 2001, the parliamentarian was
fired after expressing views about reconciliation that were
contrary to what the majority party wanted.

72. See generally id.
73. See generally Oh, supra note 18.
74. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6, at 252–53.
75. Kysar, supra note 9, at 2133.
76. Reconciliation limits provisions to ten years and calculates whether
they exceed the permissible deficit ceiling over the next ten years. So a
sunset in the ninth year, allowing rates to pop up to the old high level,
reduced the impact of the rate cuts (over the whole ten years) by about ten
percent. This allowed a rate cut during the nine years of about ten percent
more in those nine years. It depended on the very dubious notion that
Congress would let the rates pop right back up in the tenth year. A
sophisticated treatment of the reconciliation issue may be found in Michael
W. Evans, The Budget Process and the “Sunset” Provision of the 2001 Tax
Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405 (2003).
77. See Charles Teifer, Out of Order: The Abrupt Dismissal of the
Parliamentarian Threatens Senate Procedure, LEGAL TIMES (May 14, 2001).
See also Andrew Taylor, Senate’s Agenda to Rest on Rulings of Referee
Schooled by Democrats, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1063 (2001).
78. Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 52, at 338–39.
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Judicial nominations followed a curious course during the
2003–2006 period.79 Senate Democrats feared that if
they
dragged their feet on controversial Supreme Court nominations,
Republicans would use the nuclear option.80 To avoid that, Senate
moderates from both parties, nicknamed the “Gang of 14,” struck
a deal.81 The minority agreed not to use the filibuster for judicial
nominations unless there were “extraordinary” circumstances, and
the majority agreed not to use the “nuclear option.”82 Looked at
one way, this period prefigured the slide into use of the nuclear
option for non-Supreme Court judicial nominations in 2013–2017.
Looked at another way, the fact that moderates from both parties
could strike a deal provides a precedent for how a future Senate
could make procedural peace on a range of subjects without
completely suppressing the minority party and thus denying all
deliberation.
In 2009–2010, a Democratic President, House, and Senate
had a strong electoral mandate and passed several enormously
important laws. Perhaps most important, they enacted the ACA,
sometimes referred to as “Obamacare.”83 The ACA marked an
important moment in reconciliation. Initially, in 2009, key
majority senators successfully opposed reconciliation, arguing that
this subject matter was too deserving of deliberation to have its
consideration truncated through the reconciliation process.84 The
bill made its way through the Senate, backed by a sixty-senator
Democratic majority, and thus could be defeated by filibuster if
even a single majority senator defected. Senate consideration was
grueling for the majority (and infuriating for the minority), but it
was a triumph for working the old-fashioned way, without

79. See generally E. Stewart Moritz, “Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric
Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process, 22 J.L. &. POL. 341
(2006).
80. See generally Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial Selection During
the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a Nuclear Winter, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 225, 225 (2006).
81. See Charlie Cook, Frist, Reid Lost When Gang of 14 Took Over, NAT’L
J. (2005) (analyzing the immediate interpretations and reactions).
82. Id.
83. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS supra note 14, at 142.
84. Id. at 142–45.
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reconciliation and without short-circuiting deliberation.
However, in 2010, the Democratic majority lost its sixtieth
senator after a Republican won a vacancy election.85 The House
had adopted a different version of the ACA, and in order for the
ACA to become law, the Senate had to pass a compromise version.
Now one vote short of the sixty-vote supermajority needed for
ordinary legislation, the Senate majority brought the compromise
version back as a reconciliation bill, reducing the needed vote tally
from sixty to fifty votes.86 Republicans would later point to this
precedent in order to justify their use of reconciliation in an
attempt to repeal the ACA.
During President Obama’s two terms, Republicans
filibustered many judicial nominees, some executive nominees,
and many bills as well. At one point the Senate majority and
minority negotiated a deal to limit filibusters, but that
accomplished little. As described above, Senate Majority Leader
Reid carried out his threat to use the nuclear option in 2013 for all
executive and judicial positions except the Supreme Court.87
Minority Leader McConnell warned that the time would come
when the shoe was on the other foot, accurately predicting that he
would eventually use the nuclear option, as he did in 2017.
5.

2016 Election

The 2016 election recreated the same configuration as the
2000 election: a Republican President elected by a minority of
voters and a Republican House and Senate. As in 2000, the 2016
election did not, by any stretch of the imagination, provide the
Republican Senate with an electoral mandate for one-party action.
As the Senate had been 50–50 in 2001, so it was 52–48 in 2017.88
Traditionally, such small Senate majorities necessitated a degree
of bipartisanship to enact legislation. In order to get to the
supermajority of sixty votes required for overcoming determined
resistance by a large faction of the minority, a President would
need eight senators from the minority party. There was precedent
for reaching across party lines in order to obtain sixty votes.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Kysar, supra note 9, at 2136.
Dauster, supra note 25, at 633.
The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6, at 242.
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President Clinton made multiple bipartisan trade and welfare
deals with a Republican Congress in order to obtain centrist
results such as NAFTA.89 Going this route would require some
Democratic votes for Republican-backed legislation.
Both President Bush and President Trump were elected by a
minority of the voters. Both sought massive tax cuts that would
be regressive in structure and impact.90 In key
respects,
President Trump had a far more ambitious agenda. Initially, he
hoped to “repeal and replace” the ACA, cut taxes, slash spending
on programs for the poor, and enact an infrastructure program.
He succeeded in enacting an enormous tax-cut bill, slashing
corporate rates, ending key middle class deductions, and ending
the health insurance individual mandate that meant 13 million
insureds would lose coverage.91 The plan was to use reconciliation
for these legislative changes that are significantly programmatic,
including shrinking regulatory agencies like the Environmental
Protection Agency.
B. Benefits of Avoiding One-Party Rule
It is worthwhile to address why there is any demerit at all in
procedures that overcome gridlock. Much of the commentary on
this issue has either asserted or assumed that gridlock is
uniformly reprehensible, and that long-standing barriers to
enactment that are rooted in a minority party role should be
removed whenever possible.92 Such an approach may seem
particularly attractive after several Congresses have come and
gone without passing any important legislation.
Despite the barriers to action, in 2009 Congress was able to
89. Patrick Cockburn, Clinton Woos Republicans to Secure NAFTA Vote:
President Offers to Support Re-election of All Who Help Get Trade Accord
Through US Congress as Narrow Victor Predicted, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov.
15, 1993, 1:02 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/clinton-woosrepublicans-to-secure-nafta-vote-president-offers-to-support-re-election-of-allwho-1504425.html [https://perma.cc/2YT3-FGMS].
90. How to Steal a Trillion, supra note 21, at 425; see also Edward J.
McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of
Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006).
91. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
92. See Michel J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2107, 2114 (2013); see also Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s
Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2013).
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pass a major agenda over minority resistance: a trillion-dollar
stimulus bill, the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, and, above all,
the ACA. It also passed other significant bills over vigorous
minority resistance, such as legislation giving the FDA the
authority to regulate tobacco products. This was not gridlock.
The 2008 election provided a national mandate, making it possible
to move beyond the gridlock.
Even during times of relative gridlock, such as 2007–2008 and
2011–2016, Congress managed to pass annual appropriations
bills.93 When these appropriations bills ran into difficulty,
Congress resorted to simpler and less specific continuing
resolutions. In other years, Congress enacted fully-detailed
appropriations, complete with policy riders. These appropriations
bills constitute legislative action, deciding not just spending, but
also policy. For example, Congress blocked Obama’s key initiative
to close Guantanamo through an appropriations bill.
During the Obama Administration, Congress enacted other
bills, including the extension of tax cuts and spending caps. So
congressional action or inaction during 2007–2016 was not an allor-nothing proposition. The role of the minority party in the
Senate during this time period effected a balance, however crude,
between inaction on major legislation and action on
appropriations and lesser bills. Congressional achievements
during the Obama Administration include a few pieces of
substantial legislation (e.g., the ACA and Dodd-Frank) which were
enacted while the President’s party controlled both houses of
Congress, along with significant enactments relatively narrow in
scope that were attached to appropriations bills.
When changes in Senate procedure decrease the role for
deliberation, there is an increased risk of one-party rule. Some of
our most significant legislative achievements were made possible
when the President’s party had a supermajority in the Senate
and/or other manifestations of a strong electoral mandate. A
classic example occurred in the mid-1960s after the national
election mandate of 1964 led to enactment of President Johnson’s
“Great Society” program (notwithstanding very strong
conservative barriers in the Senate).94 Other electoral mandates
93. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 143–67.
94. Id. at 16–17.
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occurred in 1980 (with the election of Ronald Reagan) and in 1992
(with the election of Bill Clinton).
The most recent electoral mandate on this scale occurred in
2008. Democratic candidate Obama won the Presidency by nine
million votes, and the Democratic majority in the Senate reached
sixty seats. Initially, Obama was able to pursue a strong
legislative program and get his nominees confirmed without using
either the nuclear option or reconciliation (except for the final
round of ACA enactment).
The election of 2016 contrasted sharply with those of 1964
and 2008, and did not result in the same kind of national electoral
mandate. Republican candidate Trump received three million
fewer votes than his Democratic rival, winning the Presidency
only due to the odd math of the Electoral College.95 In the Senate,
Republicans had only a narrow 52–48 majority, well short of
President Obama’s 60–40 majority after the 2008 election.
Moreover, President Trump has not proven himself to be an
effective leader of Congress the way that Johnson, Reagan, and
Obama did. Thus, the majority party’s drive for major legislative
accomplishments in 2017 lacked a strong national electoral
mandate to support it.
C. Polarization and Other Factors
Certain powerful causes have driven these developments in
Congress. First comes national polarization.96 In the past, more
states served as Senate swing states. For example, up to the
1980s, parts of the South had strong historic ties to strongly
conservative Democrats who often voted like conservative
Republicans.97 Similarly, in the past, parts of the Northeast had
historic ties to moderate Republicans. But, competition came from
Democrats, increasingly tied to national Democratic figures more
in tune with the regional views. In today’s vocabulary, the
Northeast is “blue,” leaning Democratic in Senate elections.98
95. Erik M. Jensen, The Foreign Emoluments Clause, 10 ELON L. REV. 73,
89 (2018).
96. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 6–7.
97. BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN
EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH
137 (Harvard University Press, 2006).
98. Id. at 191.

2019]

ONE-PARTY RULE

71

Moreover, the political party has become less ideologically
diverse, and on average has moved from the center toward
opposite ideological poles. During the 1970s, the most significant
division in the Senate was ideological rather than party-based.
There was a “conservative coalition”—conservative Democrats
who teamed up with Republicans (other than moderate
Republicans from the North).99 Regardless of whether Democrats
or Republicans were in the majority, the conservative coalition
controlled powerful institutional structures in the Senate.
Committees had much greater power at that time than they do
today, and committee chairs were appointed based on seniority.100
As a result, conservative Democrats held a disproportionate share
of those committee chairs. To preserve their institutional power,
those conservative Democratic committee chairs would sometimes
bend their actions toward the choices of the national Democratic
Party as a whole. Hence, during Democratic majorities, the
chamber generally took a moderate position, balancing the
preferences of conservatives who held institutional power with the
preferences of moderates and liberals who outnumbered
conservatives.
In contrast, the modern Senate is highly polarized along party
lines. When the Senate considered the ACA in 2009, no
Republicans voted in support. Eight years later, when Senate
Republicans sought to repeal the ACA, no Democrats voted in
support. When the Senate moved to the “nuclear option”
(removing the supermajority requirement) in 2013 for most
nominations and in 2017 for Supreme Court nominations, the
decisive procedural votes were along party lines.
Similarly, when the Senate uses the reconciliation process to
enact key bills, senators vote largely along party lines, with the
majority party voting in favor of the reconciliation process and the
minority party voting against. With tax cut legislation, some
members of the minority party cross party lines to vote with the
majority on final passage. But at an earlier critical stage, when
the issue on amendments is precisely how the tax rate changes
will favor the wealthy, those votes largely fall along party lines.
The process of ideological polarization has gained momentum
99.
100.

THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 6.
Id. at 4.
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along path-dependent lines.101 The Senate maintains a sharp
procedural distinction between its two types of business:
legislation and confirmations.102 In 2013, when the Senate
removed the supermajority requirement to confirm executive
branch and lower-court nominees, it reinforced the distinction
between legislation and confirmations by maintaining the
supermajority cloture requirement for legislation. Four years
later, in 2017, the Senate removed the supermajority requirement
for Supreme Court nominees, but did not remove the
supermajority requirement for enacting legislation.103 The
established line between legislation and confirmations made that
a natural stopping point.104
Another path dependent feature is the distinction between
annual appropriations bills and general fiscal legislation. Senate
rules ease passage of appropriations bills by prohibiting
amendment of such bills with “legislation” (i.e., provisions that
make policy rather than appropriating specific amounts of
money).105 This limitation speeds passage of appropriations bills
by avoiding the controversies over policy that can slow down
legislation. There has been no attempt to adopt appropriations
through the reconciliation mechanism. If an appropriation bill
cannot pass, the Senate instead passes a continuing resolution,
which extends the previous year’s spending levels. Neither party
101. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 931–33 (2005).
102. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 20, at 605–13.
The Senate refers to its consideration of nominations and treaties as the
“executive calendar.” The Senate rule change cannot decrease the number of
votes required for approval of treaties because the Constitution requires a
two-thirds vote for ratification. Id.
103. Neal Devins, Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization: Why
Congress Rarely Checks the President and Why the Courts Should Not Take
Congress’s Place, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 55, 66 (2018).
104. See Jeffrey Toobin, Blowing up the Senate, NEW YORKER (Mar. 7,
2005),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/03/07/blowing-up-thesenate [https://perma.cc/A4PZ-MW8R]. Senator Charles Grassley identified a
reason to retain the supermajority requirement for legislation but not
confirmations: “Filibusters are designed so that the minority can bring about
compromise on legislation. You can always change the words of a bill or the
dollars involved. But you can’t compromise a Presidential nomination. It’s
yes or no.” Id.
105. U.S. SENATE, THE STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, RULE XVI(D)
(2013).
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gets the change in direction that it would want. While this may be
a suboptimal way to govern, it ensures relative stability.106
The discussion up to this point warrants a question few have
asked. What practical benefits accrue from preventing a party
with a majority but not an electoral mandate from pushing its own
ideological agenda through the Senate? The literature critiquing
gridlock seems to imply that a majority party should be able to
push through its agenda on a one-party basis even when it lacks a
sizable electoral mandate.
D. Principles
The benefits of promoting deliberation and avoiding one-party
rule fall into three categories: legitimacy, rationality, and
balance.107 As to legitimacy, we must distinguish technical
constitutional legitimacy from democratic legitimacy in terms of
political theory. A bill pushed through the Senate using the
reconciliation procedure (or, in the future, the nuclear option)
would have technical constitutional legitimacy if it also passes the
House and is signed into law by the President. That would satisfy
Article I, section 7, clause 2, achieving technical constitutional
legitimacy even if the predominant sentiment in the country
opposed the bill.
However, a bill pushed through the Senate using the
reconciliation procedure or the nuclear option may well lack
democratic legitimacy. Even after enactment, most of the public
may oppose the law. The public may express that predominant
sentiment through hostile polls, at angry public demonstrations
and town halls, in harshly reactive regular and social media, and
by engaging in counter-activity at the state and local level. If the
issue is sufficiently salient, the next election or two could result in
enough congressional support for repeal, making it possible to roll
back the legislation or at least limit its implementation. The
struggles over pushing through and later repealing such
legislation can chew up and swallow a large share of the nation’s
stock of time, attention, and political consensus.
Deliberation may also increase the rationality of resulting
106.
107.

THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 41–43.
See also RICHARD A. ARENBERG & ROBERT B. DOVE, DEFENDING THE
FILIBUSTER: THE SOUL OF THE SENATE 106 (Indiana University Press, 2012).
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legislation. At least some of the time, wisdom, and stability in the
eyes of a diverse country may lie in the middle of the political
spectrum. This tendency to favor a middle (rather than extreme)
path can be found in the record of appropriations bills, responsible
for the country’s overall federal spending (apart from entitlements
like Medicare). Appropriations do change with changes in
congressional majority parties, but the shifts are not nearly as
profound as the more partisan parts of party agendas.
Procedural rules facilitate a relatively stable level of
appropriations, and bipartisan congressional sentiment favors
stability in appropriations. Appropriations last only one year, and
hence need annual passage. This necessary pattern of regular
passage promotes continuing steady bipartisan compromise and
support, facilitating gradual adaptation to political change.
Changes to appropriations tend to be moderate, different from
substantive legislation that bursts forth on a particular subject at
comparatively long intervals. The procedures for appropriations
are a long-term expression of a bipartisan congressional sentiment
favoring stable support for annual action. This, in turn, reflects a
judgment that the wise and rational approach for appropriations
requires stability and centrism.
A third benefit is balance. The system of checks and balances
is meant to prevent the accumulation of undue power. The
Senate’s supermajority cloture requirement is not technically part
of the constitutional system of checks and balances.108 The
Senate’s traditional stance against one-party, bare-majority rule is
similarly necessary for the system of checks and balances.
Without the supermajority requirements, radical shifts of
direction come too quickly. One party had a bare majority in the
Senate in early 2001, then lost that majority in mid-2001, and won
it back again in early 2003. If a bare majority could freely pursue
its agenda, that would produce dizzying shifts in where the
legislative ship is heading. Costly triumphs of interest groups
rooted in a single party would alternate frequently between
achieving victory and being vanquished, undermining the
country’s stability.
108. Brent Wible, Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to
a
Consensus—and
Moderation—Forcing
Mechanism
for
Judicial
Confirmations, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 954 (2005).
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The absence of an electoral mandate should be understood to
mean that a majority of the country does not want the extreme
policies that result from one-party rule. When a bare legislative
majority can exercise great power without accommodating the
minority’s concerns, a substantial plurality of people, if not a
majority, are likely to feel alienated from the government.
IV. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS

The Senate has the ability to change its rules and procedures
in order to produce a more balanced, less polarizing legislative
process. When the majority party can exert its will unilaterally,
the minority party experiences a kind of powerlessness. The goal
should be to give the majority party enough of an incentive to
pursue a centrist alliance with members of the minority party that
it would forego the cruder approach of pushing bills and nominees
through on a one-party basis. For this approach to work, the rules
must give members of the minority party some power of
procedural resistance. This can be accomplished by tweaking the
supermajority requirement so that the majority party has a
reason to mine the minority party for support.
For example, the Senate could reinstate a supermajority
cloture requirement for confirmation of Supreme Court Justices in
exchange for the Senate minority party promise to filibuster
nominees only if there are “extraordinary circumstances.” This
concept—including this specific language—comes from the 2005
“Gang of 14” compromise.109 In concrete terms, it would mean
that the current Senate majority would need a supermajority to
confirm a nominee who would shift the ideological balance of the
Supreme Court.
A more challenging measure would be to make it easier—but
not too much easier—for the majority to pass legislation without
resorting to the nuclear option or reconciliation. One way to do
that would be to lower the threshold for cloture below the current
sixty votes, but only if some of the votes for cloture come from the
minority party.110 For example, the cloture threshold could be
109. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster,
the Median Senator, and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT.
REV. 257, 282 (2005).
110. Benjamin Eidelson, The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980,
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lowered to fifty-seven votes, as long as those fifty-seven include at
least five votes from the minority party, giving the majority party
an incentive to negotiate sufficiently centrist legislation to win
five senators from the minority party.111 This way, a majority
party that held less than sixty seats could weaken—rather than
destroy—the supermajority requirement, without sinking to the
nuclear option.112
Another possible compromise would involve changing the
rules for reconciliation, allowing the majority party to use
reconciliation for largely non-fiscal bills, such as health care, but
permitting the minority party to offer relevant but non-germane
proposals as amendments. The reconciliation process does not
permit robust debate through consideration of minority
amendments, making it inappropriate for complex and important
legislation like healthcare reform. Health care entitlements, such
as Medicare and Medicaid, will need legislative reforms in years to
come as the population ages and health care costs rise. In light of
Democrats using reconciliation in 2010 for the last vote on the
ACA and Republicans attempting to use it to repeal the ACA in
2017, the Senate is unlikely to bar use of reconciliation for future
healthcare reform. But the Senate could legitimize the health
care reform process and strengthen its ability to deliberate on
such legislation by allowing the minority to offer additional kinds
of amendments.
More broadly, the Senate needs to create incentives for
members of both parties to become open to supporting compromise
proposals and centrist bills from the other party. For example,
centrists in the majority party could withhold support for cloture
for a reasonable time, facilitating an open procedure before a bill
nears final passage. Conversely, centrists in the minority party
could offer support for cloture after a reasonable time, recognizing
that they have had an opportunity to shape or moderate the bill.
1004 (2013) (“Rather, the majority that is prevented from holding a vote has
been made up of only 54.5 senators on average.”).
111. Id. at 1016–17 (analyzing lowering the threshold).
112. Id. at 1010. When the almost-sixty majority senators pushing for
cloture at Democrats, they represent a higher majority of the population;
when Republicans are in the majority, they represent a lower majority—or
possibly even a minority—because Democratic senators tend to represent
higher average populations. Id.
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This could provide a path for centrists in both the majority and
minority parties to seek compromise.
Senators may be reluctant to step away from bright-line allor-nothing action. Majority party senators may be reluctant to
give up the power provided by one-party rule. Minority party
senators may be reluctant to give up their remaining ability to rail
against the majority party agenda.
Repeated moves toward one-party rule have diminished the
Senate’s ability to deliberate on significant legislative changes.
The Senate can reinvigorate its deliberative role by restoring—
and adjusting—its requirement of a supermajority. It can keep
changing in a new and different way. We need it to. Let us hope
it will.

